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Abstract: Readiness is the current mantra in the climate finance discourse and is a key determinant
for accessing climate finance. This study develops and applies an analytical 3-dimensional framework
to appraise climate finance readiness in selected Asia-Pacific countries. Three dimensions of readiness
are identified: (1) Policies and Institutions, (2) Knowledge Management and Learning, and (3) Fiscal Policy
Environment. Using the Climate Public Expenditure and Institutional Review as the basis for such
framework, the study uncovers a massive readiness gap between countries in the Asian sub-region
and those in the Pacific sub-region. The study also found that readiness has a predictable, yet small,
impact on the magnitude of climate finance accessed. This suggests that improving readiness alone is
not sufficient to unlock climate finance, as access to climate finance is to a larger extent determined by
other factors; this is critical to shaping readiness endeavors for the Pacific Small Island Developing
States (PSIDS), as well as for donors. This study argues for a re-think in the PSIDS current readiness
approach, reducing emphasis on multilateral and private flows and diversifying through practical
and uncomplicated bilateral and remittance sources. These two sources of finances have a good track
record of consistently mobilizing external finance to PSIDS despite their climate finance readiness
status. Broadening readiness efforts towards these two alternative funding sources extends the
feasibility of the current readiness approach. The present direction of climate finance readiness offers
a continuing access dilemma to many of the PSIDS, especially the poorest and most vulnerable.
Keywords: climate finance; readiness; Asia-Pacific; Small Island States; bilateral; remittances; CPEIR;
PSIDS; climate change
1. Introduction
Access to climate finance remains an on-going negotiation issue within the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Precisely determining how much climate
finance has been mobilized so far is challenging, as estimates differ depending on definitions and
accounting procedures. Donors tend to mobilize a significant portion of their climate finance
contributions outside of the UNFCCC financial mechanisms, further complicating their accounting [1].
Reasons for the use of non-UNFCCC sources are manifold, ranging from proximity to donors’ interest,
to domestic laws and political environment, aid effectiveness, donor visibility, and flexibility [2].
Nevertheless, one thing is certain: climate finance commitments have increased significantly following
the adoption of the landmark 2015 Paris Agreement [3].
A global stocktake of climate finance sources indicated that there are more than 50 international
public funds, 60 carbon markets, and 6000 private equity funds [4,5], as well as 99 multilateral and
bilateral climate funds, currently in operation [6]. Such proliferation of climate finance sources is a
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blessing and a curse for poor and small vulnerable countries [7]. The blessing is the increased number
of potential funding opportunities available, while the curse is the further fragmentation of an already
convoluted climate financing landscape [7]. Consequently, the increase in climate financing sources
has triggered a race for readiness amongst developing countries as they compete to maximize access to,
and leverage from, these varied opportunities.
While no definition of readiness has achieved broad consensus, it is generally understood as the
process of enhancing the capabilities of developing countries to receive and spend climate finance
wisely, as well as report on its transformative impacts [4,8,9]. Readiness has become a common
currency of the global climate finance discourse, because it is regarded as the pre-requisite for access to
predictable and quality climate finance [10,11].
There is a growing global effort, specifically through the Green Climate Fund (GCF), to provide
readiness support to developing countries, especially the particularly vulnerable countries (within
the UNFCCC process, countries classified as Least Developing Countries (LDCs), Small Island
Developing States (SIDS), and Africa are recognized as being particularly vulnerable to climate
change). This is deemed necessary, because the route to readiness is not only complex but also heavily
resource-centric [12]. The objective of levelling the playing field is fundamental to the readiness focus of
multilateral funds such as the GCF, in order to ensure all developing countries effectively participate
in the global climate finance architecture [13]. It is also important to note that the GCF readiness
approach, like other multilateral climate funds such as the Adaptation Fund, tends to adopt a narrow
scope of readiness by assessing institutions rather than adopt a country-wide perspective. Readiness as
per the GCF relates to the preparation of a national accredited entity (NAE) of a developing country to
directly access finance from the Fund. To date, 123 readiness projects covering 88 developing countries
and costing USD 39.5 million have been approved by the GCF [14].
However, given the multiple sources of climate finance that exist to date [1] and the growing
emphasis on the role of private finance in funding climate related activities [15–17], readiness needs to
be viewed as a nationwide phenomenon rather than a mere institutional issue. This because donors are
now stressing the importance of countries facilitating an attractive enabling/investment environment
so that private finance can catalyze public climate finance [18]. This processes of ‘creating an attractive
investment environment’ is understood by many as the ‘readying phase’, as it involves activities that
make a country better positioned to attract international and domestic private sector investments in
climate compatible projects [19,20]. Activities under this readiness approach include strengthening of
regulatory frameworks, institution building, capacity building, and provision of incentives to attract
private sector investments towards climate change initiatives [11,20].
Holistically understanding the progress of readiness across countries is quite difficult due to
the sparsity of existing readiness literature and the varying foci of readiness support. However,
more important is the absence of a universal appraisal framework on which readiness progress can be
evaluated and tracked.
The absence of such a readiness appraisal framework is driven by the nascent and evolving
understanding of the climate finance readiness concept [21,22]. This complexity is evident in
the numerous working definitions of readiness in the existing literature, and in the plethora of
readiness-related activities being implemented by donors in developing countries [22]. Moreover,
most readiness studies tend to focus on readiness challenges and how to redress such issues [22].
Minimal research is focused on how to evaluate readiness progress at a more strategic level or compare
and contrast readiness progress between countries in order to identify opportunities for inter-country
learning and collaboration.
This paper attempts to bridge this knowledge gap by developing a consistent and coherent
readiness framework, founded on existing literature and driven by empirical analysis. Such a
framework could contribute to improving how donors approach readiness by providing further
guidance on readiness-related investments in the long term, more effective targeting of areas that
need strengthening in national policy, effective longitudinal monitoring of readiness progress, and a
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better understanding of the magnitude of risks posed by climate change in relation to a country’s
abilities [23]. This framework adds a critical element that has been largely absent in existing readiness
initiatives: a set of criteria/indicators by which countries could evaluate and appraise their readiness
progress. Four main questions guided this study: (1) What components of a readiness framework can
consistently appraise the readiness progress of developing countries? (2) What indicators appropriately capture
such readiness components? (3) How would countries fare in evaluation using such a framework? and (4) Does
countries’ readiness progress significantly influence the amount of climate finance accessed? Such an appraisal
framework for readiness is purposeful, as it can promote targeted south-south cooperation through
cross-country comparison and knowledge exchange. To operationalize and validate the readiness
appraisal framework, 12 Asia-Pacific countries were studied.
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 briefly outlines the case study countries,
while the methods used and their respective results are explained in Section 3. The discussions are
elaborated in Section 4. Section 5 highlights the limitations of the study with the conclusion provided
in Section 6.
2. Overview of the Asia-Pacific Region
Excluding Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea, the Asia-Pacific region is comprised
of more than 40 developing countries, home to more than half of the global population and the largest
number of the world’s poor [24]. The Asia-Pacific region is considered to be particularly vulnerable
to the impacts of climate change relative to any other region in the world [25]. The region is also the
largest recipient, and spender, of climate related finance, although finance flows unevenly among
countries [26]. Greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are increasing in the region, especially in large Asian
countries due to rapid population growth [26]. Mitigation finance, which accounts for 67% of the total
climate finance in the region, is mainly channelled to a few large and populous countries [26].
The bias towards mitigation underscores the ineffectiveness of the international climate financing
architecture at addressing the pressing needs of Pacific Small Island Developing States (PSIDS),
which are uniquely vulnerable and whose GHG emissions are minimal. The PSIDS consist of
15 countries from the Pacific sub-region for whom accessing climate finance is a continuous
challenge [27–29]. Unlike their larger Asian neighbors, the PSIDS prioritizes adaptation due to their
geographical location and topography. Securing quality adaptation finance is difficult, as its return
is humanitarian in nature when compared to the commercial returns of mitigation initiatives. It has
been estimated that the PSIDS accounts for 4–6% of the total climate finance in the Asia-Pacific region,
with bilateral sources being the primary mobilization channel [26,27,29].
While the climate finance mobilized to the Asian countries and the PSIDS vary greatly in form,
quantity, and modalities, most of these finances are still delivered outside national budgetary systems
through short-term projects. Developing countries have been highly critical of the ineffectiveness of
this modality, claiming it as burdensome and insufficient to cover the cost of climate change efforts [30].
Developing countries have also argued that the modality of short-term projects has further hampered
their capacity-building efforts and institution-building capabilities [31,32]. Other notable criticisms
of using such a funding modality are that projects are not strongly nation-driven, are often biased
towards donor needs and interests, and are generally unsustainable [32].
There is increasing mobilization of readiness support in the region to enhance and scale up
countries’ abilities to effectively access climate finance [14]. As a first step to ensuring country
ownership of climate change projects, Asia-Pacific countries are increasingly mobilizing domestic
finance through national budgetary systems [33]. Such exercise has been argued to strengthen
the capacity of the national systems to act as a vehicle of channelling and delivering international
climate finance in-country [33]; this has been also the primary focus of many readiness programs in
Asia-Pacific [14].
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3. Methods and Results
A three-phase approach was adopted to carry out this study. The first and the second phases
involve the conceptualization of a readiness appraisal framework. The Climate Public Expenditure
and Institutional Review (CPEIR) provided the foundation for developing a consistent appraisal
framework. These reports are publically available on the UNDP Governance of Climate Change
Finance website. The CPEIR country reports share common principles and present findings using
a common structure. Unlike other existing reporting platform, the CPEIR is closely related to the
issue of readiness, as it is specially designed to assess the existing national systems and processes of a
country to access and manage climate finance. The CPEIR also represents an extensive assessment
of the national enabling environment by international experts, which is synonymous with readiness
in literature [22,34]. The CPEIRs are primarily prepared by independent actors in partnership with
national governments. CPEIRs in Asia were undertaken by the UNDP, while those of the PSIDS were
conducted by the Pacific Island Forum Secretariat (PIFS), a leading intergovernmental organization
in the Pacific. The involvement of these external parties in the CPEIR development process implies
a degree of reliability and confidence in the information. In total, 12 developing countries from the
Asia-Pacific have completed a CPEIR or an equivalent, 6 of which are PSIDS. The third and final phase
of the study presented here then links the readiness scores of countries (phase 2 results) to the total
climate finance accessed to determine if a significant relationship exists between the two.
The research technique and method employed in this study closely mirrored that of [35],
who conducted an appraisal on the preparedness level of 12 PSIDS for renewable energy investments.
The data used in their analysis were derived primarily from the national reports prepared by the
International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) for each of the 12 PSIDS. The publication of [35]’s
work in a top-tiered energy policy journal provides merit that the method applied in this study is
acceptable, despite a limited sample size and scope of information used.
3.1. Phase 1—Determining a Common Scale
The main aim of the first phase was to develop a common scale for comparing countries’
readiness progress. As a first step, the CPEIR was exhaustively analyzed, and the problems explicitly
mentioned in these reports were extracted. These problems served as the basis for a common scale
on which a consistent comparison of the CPEIRs was undertaken. In total, 200 explicitly mentioned
readiness-related problems were extracted from the 12 reports (N = 12). An extensive thematic analysis
was then conducted, which yielded 48 common overarching problems that were classified into 7 broad
themes (Appendix A: Table A1). Countries were then assessed against these 48 problems, employing a
binary coding technique to indicate its presence (1) or absence (0). The rationale for using the binary
coding technique instead of a weighting system that articulates the magnitude of the problems is due to
the limited degree of information in the CPEIRs.
3.2. Phase 2—Determining the Readiness Dimensions & Indicators
To establish a more parsimonious framework of readiness, the 48 problems were reduced to
a smaller number of readiness dimensions in this second phase of the analysis. Reduction of the
48 problems to a small number of key axes of variation in readiness removes confounding issues of
covariation/overlap between problems and provides a more tractable framework for analysis and
interpretation. Principal Component Analysis (PCA) is a well-established ordination technique that
objectively converts a set of observations of possibly associated variables (problems, in this case) into
a set of values of uncorrelated variables called principal components (readiness dimensions). Thus,
a PCA was conducted to analyze the 48 problems for the 12 target countries (Phase 1 outcome) and
establish a small number of uncorrelated dimensions of readiness.
Sixty percent of the variation in the problem data was explained by the first three axes (PCA1 = 31%,
PCA2 = 19%, and PCA3 = 10%). A conservative approach was used to determine which problem
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categories were aligned to the PCA axes, by only considering factor loadings of >0.5, as those that
are contributing in a meaningful way to an axis. Thus, loadings in PCA1 were deemed to be more
closely associated with Institutions and Policies (I & P), while PCA2 was more aligned with Knowledge
Management and Learning (KM & L), and PCA3 related more to the Fiscal Policy Environment (FPE).
These 3 PCA axes formed the core dimension of the study’s conceptual readiness framework.
Once the PCA axes were determined, potential progressive readiness indicators were then
formulated with guidance from existing literature [4,21–23,36–41]. Countries were then scored against
these axes (dimensions) using the same binary technique as in Phase 1 in an attempt to capture their
readiness progress across the PCA-generated readiness dimensions. Sixty progressive indicators (20 for
each dimension) were formulated as an indicative measure of readiness progress (Table 1). Countries’
performance on the framework was then compared and contrasted by aggregating their progressive
readiness indicator scores. The countries’ scores on each readiness dimension are as tabulated in
(Figure 1).
Table 1. Readiness Themes and Progressive Indicators.
Readiness Dimension Proposed Indicator
Institutions and Policies
1. A national entity has been accredited by the GCF or the Adaptation Fund.
2. A coordination mechanism for development partners/donors for climate change
related funding, dialogue, and programming exists.
3. A coordination mechanism between other conventions relevant to Climate Change
(CC) exists.
4. A national strategy or plan to implement national climate change priorities exists.
5. CC priorities are mentioned explicitly in the national climate policy.
6. There is routine political engagement at national and provincial levels.
7. There is a national strategy on how to meet the risks and opportunities of CC.
8. There is a legal framework with incentives and compliance mechanisms that reflect
CC priorities.
9. The core functions and roles of national institutions relating to CC are
explicitly mentioned.
10. Collaboration with non-traditional stakeholders exists.
11. CC related acts and policies have been passed and endorsed by parliament.
12. A national climate change committee has been set-up.
13. There is a formal mechanism whereby all relevant stakeholders meet to discuss a
range of climate change issues.
14. Climate change focal points have been established at national, subnational, and
community levels.
15. National guidelines, which advise planning authorities on how to integrate climate
change in their planning process, have been established.
16. A specialized climate change department has been set up.
17. The climate change department is adequately funded and staffed.
18. Long-term program and project planning mechanisms that can respond to the risks
and opportunities of CC have been established.
19. Frameworks to manage planning of CC programming at the national level exist.
20. Frameworks to manage planning of CC programming at the provincial level exist.
Knowledge Management
and Learning
1. CC knowledge is generated and codified at national and local levels.
2. CC knowledge is shared and accessible through appropriate media/platforms.
3. Local governments and stakeholders have access to national and/or regional sources
of expertise on CC.
4. Global and regional learning have been adapted to the national context.
5. Global, regional, or national ‘good practices’ have been contextualized to address
community context.
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Table 1. Cont.
Readiness Dimension Proposed Indicator
Knowledge Management
and Learning
6. Government collaboration with research institutions to identify, apply, and
institutionalize CC knowledge.
7. National and local technical capacities to analyze CC issues and plan, implement,
monitor, and evaluate CC programs have been identified and strengthened.
8. Routine public awareness programs have been undertaken.
9. CC information can be accessed by the communities.
10. Environment-related education programs have been implemented at
community level.
11. Local knowledge has been ‘scaled up’ at provincial and national level.
12. Specialized training is conducted in partnership with regional and multinational
development partners.
13. Knowledge tools have been established in key ministries to link climate change in
national budgeting planning cycles.
14. A standardized methodology and key performance indicators to evaluate
adaptation/mitigation program’s effectiveness exists at the national level.
15. Budgetary allocation for human resources to manage national climate change
programs has been made.
16. A national strategy is in place to guide capacity building in CC.
17. Existing planning process takes into consideration available evidence on CC and
lessons learned from past CC programming.
18. Risk management, CC modeling, and CC scenarios inform planning at the
national level.
19. Risk management, CC modeling, and CC scenarios inform planning at the local level.
20. A central data management system has been established at national level to track,
store, and monitor climate change projects at national level and community level.
Fiscal Policy Environment
1. Have routinely accessed climate finance from variety of sources.
2. An assessment estimating the total national climate financing needs has
been undertaken.
3. CC policies have been costed.
4. A national climate fund has been established.
5. PFM performance scores favorably in PFM assessments reports.
6. Long-term financial commitments for CC-related investments have been made
by government.
7. A national climate financing policy has been developed with international
development partners.
8. Special market conditions have been created to incentivize private sector to invest in
CC-related investments.
9. Constant budgetary support from donors for CC activities has been received.
10. A pipeline of national priority climate change projects exists.
11. Innovative financing options have been developed to respond to the challenges
of CC.
12. There is sufficient financial resource mobilization for CC projects aligned to
national priorities.
13. A functioning financial management and reporting systems are in place for
CC financing.
14. Partnerships have been established between public and the private sector for
CC programming.
15. MRV system for domestic climate finance exists.
16. MRV system for international climate finance exists.
17. Government budget allocation at the local level reflects CC priorities.
18. Non-traditional stakeholders including CSOs and private sector participate in CC
program planning, implementation, and M & E.
19. Key fiscal information can be easily accessed by the public.
20. National audit reports are scrutinized by legislative bodies.
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Figure 1. Indicative readiness progress of countries in the Asia-Pacific Region as per the study’s framework.
3.3. Phase 3—Linking Countries’ Readiness Progress to Climate Finance Accessed
The purpose of this phase is to determine if there is a statistically significant relationship between
the countries’ readiness scores as per the framework (Phase 2 results) and the total climate finance
accessed. A simple multivariate model was formulated to evaluate such relationship. The model
derived is as follows:
CFc = β0 + β1 RE1 + β2 GDPpc2 + β3 P3 + β4 G4 + ε
in which CF is the dependent variable and denotes the average climate finance accessed by countries
(c) in 2016 as per the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) database.
This study does not distinguish between mitigation and adaptation when assessing CF. Thus, specific
variables such as vulnerability and country status (i.e., SIDS or LDC) that influence access to adaptation
finance [42], or carbon emission intensity and carbon sinks for mitigation finance [43,44], were not
included in the model. This study’s main aim is to assess whether readiness per se significantly
influences access to climate finance. The average figure is used, as the OECD provides a lower and an
upper estimate of CF received by c in 2016 (Appendix A: Table A2). The OECD database, despite its
limitations [1,42], represents an attempt to provide comprehensive and detailed information on the
amount of climate finance provided by OCED countries. In determining the portion of aid dedicated
to climate change, donors voluntary tag their contributions using climate makers that have been
developed by the OECD (i.e., mitigation and adaptation markers). The climate markers do not provide
the exact amount of climate finance provided; however, they can provide an approximation of the
climate finance amount directed to developing countries, as well as provide a common standard and
reporting rules for donors, allowing for comparability at the international level. The OECD database
includes bilateral contributions, multilateral contributions, and, in some instances, contributions by
non OECD countries. Non-OECD countries voluntary report their contributions in the OECD database.
The OECD database has been the most commonly used database for studies examining climate finance
issues [1,42–45].
The predictor variable of emphasis of the model is RE—the aggregate readiness score of countries as
per the study’s framework β—represents the beta value that measures how strong of an influence each
variable has on the dependent variable, while ε represents the residual or the error term. The 2016 gross
domestic product per capita (GDPpc) of c, their respective aggregate population (P), and the quality of
their governance (G) act as the control variables for the model; P, GDPpc, and G were derived from
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2016 World Bank database. Akin to other studies [42,43], this study calculated G using the average
scores of c across the six indicators of the quality of governance provided by the World Bank. There is
a need to control for the potential confounding effects of GDPpc, P, and G, as literature have identified
these three common factors as having significant relationship with CF flows to countries [42–44,46,47].
P and G have been argued to be positively related to CF, meaning high P and G will result in high CF
flows [42–44], while GDPpc has a negative relationship with CF, indicating that poorer countries tend
to receive more CF, all else being equal [42,46]. A hierarchical multivariate regression (enter method)
using the SPSS software was employed to run the model.
In computing the results, SPSS produces the outcomes of the multivariate regression in two
models (Appendix B: Tables A3–A5). Model 1 presents the outcomes if only the control variables P,
GDPpc, and G are considered. Model 2, which is the model of emphasis in this study, presents the
extended version of the outcomes after accounting for the control variables. A summary of the study’s
model key outcomes is illustrated below (Table 2).
Table 2. Summary of Model 2 Key Statistical Outcomes.
Statistic Value Significant Level
Adjusted R square 0.922 p < 0.05
F 33.53 p < 0.001
Beta:
Population 0.596 p < 0.05
GDP per capita −0.271 p < 0.05
Governance 0.301 p > 0.05
Readiness 0.247 p < 0.05
As per the SPSS outputs, both Model 1 and Model 2 are significant, with the former scoring an
Adjusted R square of 86.5% and the latter scoring an Adjusted R square of 92.2% (Appendix B: Table A3).
The Adjusted R squares represent the percentage of variability explained by the variables. In other
words, the control variables alone account for around 87% (Model 1) of the variability, and when RE is
factored in (Model 2) the percentage of variability explained increases to 92.2%. This indicates that
RE has a positive impact on the predictive power of the model. It is interesting to note that, while the
actual change in the R square score is only 4.9% (indicating that RE explains an additional 4.9% of the
variance on its own), the change is statistically significant (Sig.F Change = 0.034 ~p < 0.05). In other
words, the addition of RE as an additional predictor variable of CF despite having a small impact is
still statistically significant.
Model 2 is a significant predictor of CF. The F test indicates a score of (F = 33.53), which is
statistically significant at p < 0.001. This means that when controlling for the confounding variables
of P, G, and GDPpc, and using RE as the only predictor variable, the model as a whole is statistically
significant in predicting CF.
Finally, the standardized coefficient (i.e., β weight) was assessed in order to evaluate the strength
of how each of the predicator variables of the study (P, G, GDPpc, and RE) influence CF. The higher
the β value, the greater the impact of the predictor variable on the dependent variable. The results
indicated that while P, G, and RE have positive β values, with P (0.596), G (0.301), and RE (0.247),
only P and RE make a statistically significant contribution to the model, with both being significant
at p < 0.05. The β value of GDPpc was (−0.271), supporting the negative relationship argument with
CF [42,46], with the relationship being significant at p < 0.05. While the limited sample size could
explain the lack of a significant relationship between G and CF, the low significance could also relate
to the argument that unlike multilateral funds, most large bilateral donors such as the USA and France
(whose contributions make up a significant portion of total global aid) are not very selective about the
governance quality of countries they channelled their aid to [46,48]. The results therefore indicate that
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P, GDPpc, and RE, as the largest unique contributors to the model after the overlapping effects of other
variables, have been statistically removed.
4. Discussion
4.1. Rationalizing the Difference in Readiness Progress
The countries’ scores across the three readiness dimensions of this study’s framework highlighted
that their readiness progress varies greatly across the sub-regions. The Asian countries seem to
perform better on average across the 3 readiness dimensions (Avg = 35) when compared to the PSIDS
(Avg = 25). They also appear more ready to access climate finance from diverse sources [49] (see also
Appendix A: Table A2). Access to climate finance in PSIDS is still primarily limited to bilateral sources
and multinational entities, with grants being the main instruments [49].
The performance of big Asian countries across the readiness dimensions of I & P, KM & L,
and FPE is evident in the variety of financial instruments they are using to mobilize climate finance.
These innovative ways of mobilizing climate finance include the issuing of instruments such as
green bonds, tax-free infrastructure bonds for renewable energy project [50], and the establishment of
National Climate Funds (NCF) to pool domestic and international climate finance [51,52]. Creating
the environment to implement these financing mechanisms is complex and requires robust I & P
framework, a high degree of technical knowledge and learning (KM & L), and a vibrant financial sector
(FPE) to be in place [4,12,22,23,31]. From the perspectives of climate finance providers, the synergy of
these dimensions is indicative of an enabling environment in which climate finance can be effectively
managed and directed to achieving its objective [4,13,41]. In addition, Asian countries’ progressive
performance in these three readiness dimensions could also be attributed to the fact that most of them
are active participants in the REDD+ programme, an innovative and unique financial mechanism for
generating climate finance flows to developing countries [53]. Their progressive ‘finance footprint’ has
therefore not only placed them in a much better position to successfully navigate the complex climate
finance architecture but also prepared the right domestic environment to attract this finance.
For the PSIDS, the readiness framework indicates a massive readiness gap relative to their larger
Asian neighbors. However, PSIDS performed relatively better in the I & P dimension (Avg = 22)
compared to the Asian sub-region (Avg = 17). The positive progress in the I & P dimension could
be linked to the argument that SIDS in general have some of the most sophisticated governance and
policy arrangements due to their history and topography [35,54]. Moreover, such positive progress
in regard to this readiness dimension could also be explained by fact that the majority of the finance
channelled to PSIDS (86%) was geared towards strengthening climate change sector policies [27].
However, the PSIDS still lagged behind the Asia countries in the remaining two readiness dimensions
(i.e., KM & L and FPE). The major underlying readiness challenges for PSIDS in these two dimensions
are hereditary in nature due to their special and unique circumstances [55,56]. Like other SIDS,
PSIDS suffer from a chronic lack of knowledge-based capacities to implement innovative financial
instruments, and, furthermore, their financial sector is largely underdeveloped or non-existent in
some cases due to their very small and largely undiversified economies [57]. Thus, PSIDS are in a
conundrum, as despite their progress in the I & P dimension, their physical context seriously hinders
their ability to capitalize on these gains and translate them into concrete actions in the readiness
dimensions of KM & L and FPE.
4.2. Linking Readiness Progress to Climate Finance Accessed
While the study notes that the readiness effects are too recent for full impact to be apparent,
as there may be a time lag from readiness initiatives to capturing the effects in the indicators, the results
revealed that readiness has a predictable but small impact on the magnitude of climate finance accessed.
This argument is based on the evidence concerning the R squared change value of the model and,
more importantly, the β value of RE, which indicates that improving the readiness status of a country
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will require significant work addressing improvements captured by the progress indicators, but have a
small, although predictable and positive effect on climate finance accessed. This also indicates that
the readiness status of a country does not exist in a vacuum, and that it is inextricably linked to other
contextual factors in determining access to climate finance.
In addition, the current approach to readiness largely focuses on accessing finance from
multilateral funds and does not differentiate between mitigation and adaptation. If readiness were to
be discussed within the context of the USD100 billion goal of the Paris Agreement, then it is clear that
the current concept of readiness is in the context of mitigation only (see Decision 1/CP21 para 53.).
The Paris Agreement also prioritizes the role of the private sector in mobilizing climate finance because
of its ‘catalyzing capabilities’, and the current readiness discourse is in line with such position [15].
Even within the GCF, in which USD 39.5 million has been mobilized for readiness and an explicit 50:50
allocation for mitigation and adaptation is a policy, funds dispersed to approved projects so far indicate
that mitigation finance still accounts for 41%, compared to the 26% for adaptation, and the remainder
for projects that are cross cutting in nature [58]. This infers that the current readiness approach tend
to focus on attracting more mitigation finance than adaptation finance. The PSIDS are therefore at a
disadvantage within the current discourse of readiness, as their climate priorities are geared towards
adaptation instead of mitigation activities.
Although some gains have been made, increasing the level of finance available for adaptation,
a significant gap still exists [59]. Within the context of this study, the imbalance of climate finance
against adaptation clearly indicates the need to not only significantly scale-up the availability of
adaptation finance globally but to also increase the support that will ‘ready’ countries to access
this finance. For most particularly vulnerable countries such as the PSIDS, facilitating access to
sustainable adaptation finance is critical to ensure their effective participation in the global climate
finance architecture.
Moreover, the study also suggests that the level of precedence given to readiness in relation
to access to climate finance contradicts the goal of the UNFCCC. Under the Convention, while the
purpose of climate finance is to assist developing countries, Article 4(4), specifically mentions the
need to provide adaptation assistance to those that are particularly vulnerable to the impact of climate
change. While all countries can reasonably claim vulnerability to climate change, SIDS are explicitly
recognized in the Convention as particularly vulnerable. Other vulnerability studies have also affirmed
this position. For example, within the Asia-Pacific region, the PSIDS are considered more vulnerable
to their Asian counterparts as per the NDGain Vulnerability index, with mean and standard deviation
scores of 0.48 and 0.029, respectively, compared to the scores of the latter (M = 0.45, SD = 0.058).
For PSIDS, as well as the donors of readiness initiatives in the region, such findings provide ‘food
for thought’ on the viability of the current approach for readiness. Evidence seems to indicate that the
current approach to readiness will yield little improvement to the PSIDS’ demand for more access to
quality climate finance. Thus, an alternative readiness pathway should be explored.
4.3. Readiness for Bilateral and Remittance Finance—An Alternative
The proposition that PSIDS should re-orient their readiness efforts towards bilateral support
and remittances as alternative sources of sustainable climate finance is founded on the fact that they
are, and have been, the primary sources of external finance assistance to SIDS [60], and that their
flow into countries is largely insensitive to the quality of the enabling/investment environment of a
country [61,62].
Since bilateral sources have been the dominant source of climate finance for PSIDS, leveraging
such a source to its full potential is critical. For PSIDS, it makes more sense to explore such option, as
bilateral finances are largely driven by diplomacy and thus are unaffected by the stringent readiness
requirements demanded by private and multilateral sources. While some may argue that bilateral
sources cannot be a sustainable source of long-term climate finance, it is critical to point out that Article
4(4) of the Convention provides the basis to believe that, at least in the context of climate finance,
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bilateral flows will be ongoing indefinitely. Moreover, the special circumstances of the PSIDS provide
a moral basis for indefinite bilateral support for climate finance, as there is evidence that a majority
of the PSIDS economies will never reach their full development potential [63]. PSIDS may therefore
consider re-orienting their readiness approach to promote scaling up of their global diplomacy efforts,
enhancing the capacity of their foreign affairs ministries and tasking such ministries with playing a
more prominent role in the area of climate change. The ultimate goal of readiness initiatives in this
area is to scale up existing bilateral relationships, as well as build new ones. As developing countries
are also increasingly mobilizing climate finance beyond their borders, PSIDS should take an aggressive
approach in diversifying their bilateral relations and actively pursue new bilateral relationships for the
purpose of securing new sources of finance.
Remittances also offer an ideal source of climate finance and are worth exploring, as they account
for more than 40% of external financial assistance to SIDS [60]. For PSIDS, the influx of remittance
from diasporas continues to increase significantly [64] and now accounts for a significant portion of
the PSIDS GDP. For example, remittance in Samoa accounts for 23% of GDP [65]. While evidence
indicates that only 5% of such finance flow is used for productive investments [65], there is huge
potential for remittance finances to be an alternative source of climate finance for PSIDS. Existing
evidence also indicates that remittance finance meets the desired characteristics of climate finance:
predictability, sustainability, adequateness, and accessibility [65]. Remittance relative to private sector
investment continues to flow, regardless of the existing investment environment, as it is largely
motivated by the individual interest and market mechanisms [61]. The remittance pathway provides
an opportunity for PSIDS to also re-orient their readiness focus on an enabling environment that
prioritizes new entrepreneurial opportunities that can effectively harness the potential of remittance to
trigger diaspora’s investment in building national and community resilience to climate change. Senegal
and Mexico provide two case studies in which governments have been actively promoting policies
that facilitate an enabling environment in which diasporas can invest and contribute to domestic
development [66,67].
Regarding the readiness for bilateral and remittances as per the understanding of this study,
while it can be seen as a component of the larger climate finance readiness package, it represents a
different blend of readiness from that promoted by multilateral sources of climate finance. For example,
the readiness for remittances as argued by this study promotes an enabling environment in which
innovative finances such as green bonds can be used to raise new sources of climate finances. While it
can be argued that green bond is part of readiness, the target area, however, differs, as this study argues
that instead of only targeting the private sector entities to invest in green bonds, the scope should be
extended to also include diasporas (indicating that the readiness activities will be different), and this is
where the focus on readiness in PSIDS should be concentrated on given their largely underdeveloped
private sector.
5. Limitation of this Study
The small sample size of this study (i.e., N = 12) had a potential impact on the quality on results
and generalizability of its findings. In fact, the results of this study should be treated with some
reservations, as the bootstrap analysis of the model suggests that the bootstrap estimates varied
considerably from the original sample (Appendix B: Table A6). The authors of [68,69] argued that this
could indicate that the sample size used might not be satisfactory. The sample size is, however, as such
because only 12 countries in the Asia-Pacific region have completed, and have publically availed their
CPEIR. The author of [68] also argued that the results should be not be disregarded altogether if this is
the case as “...it may still be better than anything else that is available”(pg.196). In line with this argument,
this paper offers the first critical insights on how climate finance readiness has progressed in the region.
Future research could fill this data gap and build strong evidence based on the impacts of readiness
and climate finance, especially from the perspectives of PSIDS as more countries in the region release
their CPEIR studies in the future.
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6. Conclusions
This study provides critical insight in to the current approach to readiness. Firstly, evidence
from the Asia-Pacific region indicates that readiness plays a small but predictable role in accessing
climate finance. Effective access to climate finance cannot be achieved just by focusing on improving
readiness, because access is inextricably linked and influenced by other factors. Readiness does not
exist in isolation, permitting a dramatic improvement through appropriate input by governments and
donors. Secondly, while the understanding of readiness does not differentiate between mitigation and
adaptation finance, it is biased towards mitigation because of the precedence it places on creating an
enabling environment that is private sector-centric. Thirdly, the emphasis on readiness as the new
currency in the climate finance discourse suggests a divergence from the original understanding and
objective of climate finance, as encapsulated in the Convention. Climate finance is intended to be
treated differently from normal official development aid (ODA); thus, there is an expectation of donors,
especially multilateral funds such as those continuously raised during the UNFCCC process, to not
place stringent access requirements to climate finance aimed at particularly vulnerable countries. This is
echoed in the consistent call from particularly vulnerable countries to the UNFCCC for simplified and
enhanced direct access to multilateral climate funds.
These critical insights, as well as the massive readiness gap between the Asian countries and the
PSIDS, question whether the PSIDS stand any realistic chance of being ready to access predictable
and long-term climate finance. The PSIDS and its donors should rethink their current approach to
readiness towards other alternative funding sources, as there is a strong indication that the current
readiness pathways will yield little benefits to PSIDS. The misalignment between the PSIDS climate
change needs (adaptation centric) and the current readiness approach (mitigation centric) is further
exacerbated by the PSIDS’ chronic lack of resources and capacity due to their special circumstances.
Thus, the feasibility of PSIDS ever achieving a readiness status similar to their Asian counterparts is
highly unlikely.
Bilateral and remittance finances offer a practical alternative for uncomplicated sources of climate
finance that the PSIDS could target for their readiness efforts due to their strong track record of
consistently mobilizing external financial assistance in-country. In addition, the flow of finances
from these two sources is to a larger extent insensitive to the quality of the enabling/investment
environment status of a country. It is worth exploring the potential of mobilizing quality and
predictable climate finance on customizing readiness to suit these two sources. For the PSIDS,
the current readiness approach, which tends to emphasize access from multilateral funds and the
private sector, provides little assurance that it will improve their ‘access to climate finance’ conundrum
and thus should be extended to bilateral and remittances sources. Thus, as radical as this study’s
readiness recommendation may be, the impact of on-going and prolonged inaccessibility of multilateral
funds, as well as private finance for a majority of the PSIDS, will be severe, and existential for some.
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Appendix A
Table A1. Common climate finance readiness problems derived from the CPEIRs.
Policies/Laws/Regulationse
Delays in CC related policies
/plans/strategies being
endorsed and approved by
cabinet.
Inclusive Decision Makinge
Minimal
engagement/consultations
with private sector, civil
societies, and communities.
Power Structure
Fragmented institutional
settings.
Weak fiscal policy
environment.
CC policies/plans/strategies
are still being developed or
in draft.
Lack of structured
systems/processes in place to
engage all relevant
stakeholders.
Uncertain institutional
arrangement due to volatile
political environment.
Lack of long term budget
projection.
Existing CC related
polices/plans/strategies are
too broad and unclear.
Non-traditional stakeholders
no adequately represented in
the decision making bodies.
Weak institutional links
between central line
ministries and other bodies.
Weak of accountability
mechanism in place.
Existing CC related
polices/plans/strategies are
out of date.
CC-related materials are not
easily accessible by the public.
Over-governance: too many
committees with similar
roles and responsibilities
Lack of a structured approach
to holistically capture and
classify CCE in national
budgets.
Key CC policies/legislations
missing.
Coordination
Inconsistent flow of
information amongst key line
ministries.
Lack of clear mandates on
roles and responsibilities.
Evidence based decision making
Lack of reliable, complete, and
up to date data.
Knowledge Management
Lack of technical and
specialized knowledge at in
line ministries and agencies.
Critical CC
policies/plans/strategies not
harmonized and linked.
Existing CC related decision
making bodies’ lack
leadership and political
backing.
Lack of a formal data
management system to
support evidence-based policy
making.
Lack of systematic training
needs assessment within line
ministries and agencies.
Mainstreaming/integrating of
climate change into existing
strategies/plans/policies is
difficult.
Public Finance Management
No/narrow national
definition of climate finance.
Lack of a formal procedure on
data sharing amongst
government, donors, and
other stakeholders.
High staff turn-over. Lack of a formalized planningprocess.
Lack of budget support
received.
Lack of systematic M & E
systems and established
indicators at all levels to assess
performance of projects.
Heavy reliance on
international consultants.
Misalignment between CC
policies and its allocated
resources.
Heavily dependent on single
bilateral donor.
Lack of formal data
management system to
capture and store funding
from other sources.
Lack of human capacity
within key line ministries
and agencies.
Lack of coordination amongst
central CC line ministries
during CC project life cycles.
Weak PFM in place. Responsibilities of M & E notclear amongst line ministries.
Lack of long-term plan and
financial commitments to
build capacity at all levels.
Lack of awareness across line
ministries on CC related
issues.
Frequent delays in
disbursement of funds
through national systems.
Disparate collection/storage
of data and monitoring
amongst key line ministries
and agencies.
Lack of knowledge at the
community level.
Infrequent & inconsistent
meetings of key national CC
committees responsible for
coordinating CC issues.
Fragmented budgeting
structure and process.
Unclear and broad CC related
targets being set.
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Table A2. Climate Finance Accessed in 2016 [70].
Countries USD (Millions) Grants (%) Debt Instrument (%)
Lower Bound Upper Bound Average
Fiji 6.97 22.45 14.71 100 0
Nauru 0.141 2.67 1.4055 100 0
RMI 0.12 11.83 5.975 100 0
Samoa 9.14 67.17 38.155 99 1
Tonga 3.04 10.31 6.675 48 52
Vanuatu 35.4 77.23 56.315 55 45
Vietnam 1441 1081 1261 9 90
Cambodia 78.4 161.8 120.1 28 72
Thailand 7 1377 692 1 99
Bangladesh 897 1634 1265.5 13 87
Nepal 66.4 67.9 67.15 77 23
Pakistan 108 1071 589.5 11 89
Appendix B
Table A3. Model summary results.
Model
Adjusted R
Square
Std. Error of
the Estimate
Change Statistics
R Square Change F Change Sig. F Change
1 0.865 166.70143 0.902 24.425 0.000
2 0.922 126.50826 0.049 6.891 0.034
Table A4. ANOVA a results.
Model Sum of Squares Mean Square F Sig.
1
Regression 2,036,234.120 678,744.707 24.425 0.000 b
Residual 222,314.930 27,789.366
Total 2,258,549.050
2
Regression 2,146,518.663 536,629.666 33.530 0.000 c
Residual 112,030.387 16,004.341
Total 2,258,549.050
a Dependent Variable: CF; b Predictors: (Constant), Govern_quality, GDP_pc, Population; c Predictors: (Constant),
Govern_quality, GDP_pc, Population, Readiness.
Table A5. Coefficients a results.
Model
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients
t Sig.
B Std. Error Beta
1
(Constant) −106.652 101.086 −1.055 0.322
Population 3.145 × 10−6 0.000 0.468 1.919 0.091
GDP_pc −333.058 165.896 −0.244 −2.008 0.080
Govern_quality 0.352 0.177 0.487 1.989 0.082
2
(Constant) −349.370 120.142 −2.908 0.023
Population 4.002 × 10−6 0.000 0.596 3.112 0.017
GDP_pc −370.269 126.693 −0.271 −2.923 0.022
Govern_quality 0.218 0.144 0.301 1.514 0.174
Readiness 24.492 9.330 0.247 2.625 0.034
a Dependent Variable: CF.
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Table A6. Bootstrap for Coefficients results.
Model B
Bootstrap a
Bias Std. Error Sig. (2-Tailed)
BCa 95% Confidence Interval
Lower Upper
1
−106.652 72.116 b 139.419 b 0.695 b 0.000 b 0.000 b
3.145 × 10−6 3.112 × 10−6 b 6.610 × 10−6 b 0.515 b −3.435 × 10−6 b 2.611 × 10−5 b
−333.058 140.887 b 247.911 b 0.541 b 0.000 b 0.000 b
0.352 −0.245 b 0.554 b 0.561 b −0.587 b 0.762 b
2
−349.370 175.477 c 243.379 c 0.421 c 0.000 c 0.000 c
4.002 × 10−6 2.968 × 10−6 c 8.797 × 10−6 c 0.353 c −2.021 × 10−5 c 5.230 × 10−5 c
−370.269 159.302 c 244.986 c 0.396 c 0.000 c 0.000 c
0.218 −0.197 c 0.623 c 0.601 c −0.477 c 0.527 c
24.492 −10.175c 16.624 c 0.404 c 5.558 c 22.997 c
a Unless otherwise noted, bootstrap results are based on 1000 bootstrap samples; b based on 999 samples; c based on
993 samples.
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